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EMPLOYER REHAVIOR IN THE FACE OF  UNION ORGANIZING DRIVES 
AESTRACT 
The direct role of  employers in  union organizing has long been a  neg- 
lected  part of  the union organizing literature.  In this study we examine 
the determinants and consequences of employer  behavior when  faced with an 
organizing drive.  Our principal substantive  findings are: 
-  that  there is a substitution  between  high wages/benefits/good work 
conditions/supervisory  practices and "tough"  management opposition to 
unionism. 
-  that  a high innate  propensity for a  union victory deters management 
opposition,  while some indicators  of  a low  propensity also reduce opposi- 
tion. 
-  that  "positive industrial relations"  raise the chances the firm will 
defeat the union in an election, as does bringing in consultants and having 
supervisors campaign intensely against the union. 
-  that  the careers of  managers whose wagesjsupervisory practices/ 
benef  its lead  to union organizing drives,  much less to union victories, 
suffer as a result. 
In  general  we  interpret our results as consistent with the notion that 
firms behave in a profit  maximizing manner in  opposing an  organizing drive 
and with the basic proposition that management  opposition, reflected in 
diverse forms of behavior, is a  key component in the on-going decline in 
private sector unionism in the  United States. 
Richard B. Freeman  Morris  M. Kleiner 
National Bureau of  Economic Research  Humphrey  Institute 
1050 Nassachusetts Avenue  231 Humphrey Center 
Cambridge, MA  02138  301 19th Avenue, S. 
University of  Minnesota 
Minneapolis,  MN  55455 The behavior of  management toward trade unionism has changed greatly in 
the United States in  the past  quarter century.  In the 1960s management at 
most large firms recognized unions as  a permanent labor market institution 
and viewed  collective bargaining as an  acceptable  mode for determining wages 
and working conditiona.  They sought the best deals they could get through 
the bargaining process and worried that unions  had acquired too much 
economic power in societyJ  In the l970s and l980s management's attitude 
and  behavior changed dramatically.2  The goal of  a  union-free environment, 
once espoused by  fringes of  the management community, spread until by  1983 
43% of the relatively progressive firms in  the SNA's Personnel Practices 
Forum declared that being nonunion was their  major labor relations goal 
(Kochan, McKersie and Chalykoff, 1986).  Unfair labor practices committed by 
management skyrocketed despite e decline in  NLRZ representation elections, 
and approximately one-third of  the firms whose workers voted  to  unionize 
remained nonunion by  failing to sign a collective contract, effeccively 
reversing the result of  the election.3  Management opposition, of  one form 
or another, has been  found to be a key determinant of  NLRB  elections 
(Dickens, 1983;  Freeman, 1988), and many have come to believe that the 
growth of  opposition has been a major, if not the major, direct cause of the 
decline in private sector  unionism in the U.S.  (Freeman and Medoff,  1984; 
Dickens and Leonard, 1985;  Farber, 1987). 
Despite the importance of  management opposition in de-unionizing the 
private sector (where density fell from 31%  in 1967 to 13% in  1987 using 
Current Population Survey estimates) relatively little ia known about what 
determines the extent and method of cpposition to unionism during an 
organizing drive.  Is the nature and depth of  management opposition the result of  differences in  the likely costs of unionism to the firm?  Are 
higher wages and  good working conditions-  -so-called positive industrial 
relations--substitutes or  complements for hiring consultants, committing 
unfair practices, or  otherwise campaigning intensely and using expensive 
mechods of opposition against unions during an  organizing drive?  What 
management tactic appears to have the greatest impact on outcomes? 
In this paper we use two data sets gathered during l980s organizing 
drives to examine these questions.  The first set is based on a survey of 
202 establishments that had NLRB representation elections in the Boston and 
Kansas City NLR.B districts.  The survey obtained information from managera 
about the use of  consultants in  the election drive  perceived causes of  the 
drive, the  wages and benefits paid to workers, and the impact of union 
victories on the careers of  the managers; and information  from the NIlE 
shout unfair labor practices and election outcomes.  The second data set was 
obtained from a 1982-83 AFL-CIO survey of union organizers in 274 election 
drives.  The organizers survey contains data on  benefits available at  the 
firm (but not on  wages), characteristics of workers, management anti-union 
tactics, and organizers' perceptions of important tampaign issues.  Both 
data sets have weaknesses, because they lack information on  certain aspects 
of campaigns and in  part because they are obtained from persons with  - 
definite  biases.  It  is for this reason that we  examine them together, 
hopefully obtaining a more complete and accurate picture of management 
opposition than is possible with  each set separately. 
Our results reveal some substitution between "positive industrial 
re1ations  and other management tactics that may be seen as directed towards 
opposition to unions, with firms that have  higher wages and better benefits or work  conditions less likely to commit unfair labor practices than firms 
with lower wages/worse benefits or conditions.  In  our firm data set we find 
that companies that brought in consultants  were more likely to defeat unions 
than other firms, and, perhaps most strikingly, that managers whose 
establishments face organizing drives are likely to suffer in  their careers. 
In  our organizers data  set, we find that firms with  poor  work 
conditions/supervisory problems are especially likely to commit unfair 
practices while those that face a workforce with an  especially high 
propensity to organize, as reflected, in the percentage who sign 
authorization cards for  the election,  are less likely to commit unfair 
practices.  The most effective "hardnosed" company tactic is to  have direct 
supervisors campaign intensely against the union.  In  neither data set do  we 
find that committing unfair practices reduces the union's likelihood of 
winning, in part, we  surmise, because of  the endogeneity of  the practices; 
that is, firms that are more likely to lose are more likely to commit an 
unfair labor practice, and the tendency for unions to file charges after 
losing elections.  The remainder of  the paper presents the arguments and 
evidence for these claims. 
Theory of Management  ()poosition 
How does management  react to a union  organizing drive at  a particular 
locality?  What influences the  specific types of policies is it likely to 
adopt once it knows it is headed for an NLRB election?  In this section we 
postulate that the reaction to an  organizing drive will depend on  three 
factors:  the probability that the union will win the ensuing election and 
obtain a contract, and the expected impact of management opposition on that 
probability; the costs of opposition; and the prospective loss of profits due to unionization, which itself  depends on  the likely union wsge impsct. 
The model predicts an  inverse  U-shaped curve relating management opposition 
to  the probability of  a union win; a negative relation between "positive 
industrial relations" (high wages,.  benefits, good working conditions) and 
opposition; greater impacts on election outcomes for more expensive forms of 
opposition; and highlights the problem of evaluating  what  opposition does to 
outcomes when  opposition is  endogenous. 
We  assume at the outset that principal-agent issues  between management 
and shareholders are of  negligible importance  and thus that management's 
actions are determined by  perceptions of  what unionization will do to 
expected profits.  This is not an  innocuous  assumption.  Union-induced 
changes in  shareholder returns are unlikely to affect significantly the 
economic position of most managers, particularly the lower-level foreman and 
other supervisors whose behavior is critical to any management campaign to 
defeat unions.  We  assume, and later provide evidence consistent with our 
assumption, that firms' managerial personnel policy substitutes for the 
incentive of ownership.  Conversely, lower-level  management may devote 
resources to oppose unions when it is not in the shareholder's interest, 
sacrificing profits for control and greeter flexibility at the work place. 
Further, as some union corporate campaigns make clesr, it is possible to 
pressure shareholders or  management into neutrality in representation 
elections, possibly at  the expense  of  profits,  by imbedding the issue of  the 
union drive into a broader problem of,  for example, obtaining assets from  a 
major financial institution (Pruitt,  Wei,  and White, 1988). 
For  simplicity, we also ignore  potential strategic game theoretic 
interactions between management opposition and union organizing efforts (e.g., management drives to oppose unions in one plant to send a message to 
unions about other plants; management decisions that depend on potential 
responses by  the union organizing committee to target a company within a 
geographic area). 
In simplest form our model contains three basic equations: 
(1) Probability of  a  union victory in  the campaign:  P(X,MO) with  P'— 
P/MO <0, with  MO — management  opposition  and  X  — other factors that 
determine worker propensity to support a  union, such as the composition of 
the work  force, special  conditions in the firm, and so on.  Zecause P is 
bounded between 0 and 1 we postulate a logistic form, with P'—-B(l-P)(P) 
where B is the impact parameter of  MO in the logistic equation. 
(2) Cost of  opposition: C(MO) with C'I"O, where we  include as opposition 
such actions as:  committing unfair labor  practices; hiring specialized 
consultants to direct an  anti-union campaign;  directing supervisors to 
devote time and effort to convince workers to oppose the union, etc. 
(3)  Loss of  profits due to unionization: L(WD) with L'>O, where WD 
measures the likely wage (or cost) difference between the firm when it is 
union and when it  is not. 
We  assume that the firm seeks to minimize the expected loss from 
unionization, subject to the Cost and probability functions.  The solution 
yields an  inverted U-shaped relation between the extent of  opposition and 
what we  will call the innate  probability of  a union victory, P(X,O),--the 
probability the union wins absent any management opposition.  The simplest 
way to see the inverted  U is to consider the decision whether or  not to 
oppose an  organizing drive.  If the  firm does not oppose the drive it has an 
expected loss of L P(X,O).  If it opposes the drive and chooses the optimum 6 
level of opposition MO* with  cost 0*, it  has an expected loss of 0*  + L  P(X, 
MO*)the sum of (L + 0*)  P(X, MO*),  the probability weighted loss if it 
fails to  defeat the organizing drive and  [l-P(X,  110*)] 0*, the prohability 
weighted loss if it  succeeds in  defeating the drive.  Given these costs the 
firm  will oppose the union drive if  the expected savings from opposition 
exceed the cost of  the management campaign: 
(4) -L  DP  > 0*, where OP  — P(X,  110*) 
- P(X,O),  or, letting dP 
approximate the change in  probability, B(l-P)P  > G*/L 
Because the derivative of  the logistic (or any similarly shaped 
probability function like the normal) varies with the level of probability, 
(4)  implies a nonlinear relation between company opposition and the (innate) 
probability of  a  union victory: when  P is large end the union near certain 
to win, the firm will  forego campaigning against the union; similarly when  P 
is smell,  the firm  will forego campaigning as it does not have to worry 
seriously about a union victory.  Only when there is serious doubt about the 
likely victor will management work hard  to oppose the union. 
Turning to the optimum level of management opposition, the interior 
solution requires that the firm equate the marginal expected benefit of 
opposition and the marginal cost of opposition: 
(5) F' L — B PU-P) L — C' 
Since F' depends on PU-F), we  again get a  predicted nonlinear relation 
between  the  "innate" probability of a union win and management opposition. 
The closer P is to  one-half, the greater is the marginal benefit from 
opposition, and thus the greater the likely opposition. 
Solving the model for management opposition yields the basic equation 
of  concern in this study- 
-  the relation between management opposition and the 7 
likely union-induced loss in profits, the innate probability the union will 
win the election (in s nonlinear manner), and the costs of  opposition: 
(6) MO — F(L,  P(X,O), C),  where dF/dL > 0, dF/dC < 0,  and where dF/dP 
rises snd then  fslls with the level of P.  As  all of  the explanatory 
variables in (6) are exogenous the equation  can be  estimated by  single- 
equation methods. 
The endogeneit  of mansgement opposition creates problems, however, in 
estimating the other key relation in the model, the structural impact of 
opposition on  outcomes (equation (1))  Unless the factors that determine 
the innate probability of  a union win are perfectly specified, single- 
equation estimates of P(X,M0) will be  biased, presumptively toward 0. 
Consider, for example, the extreme case when we  have no  information on 
F(X,0).  If  the probability of a union win is innately, high, we will observe 
little opposition, and  incorrectly  infer' that the lack of opposition caused 
the win.  By  the nonlinearity'  of  the opposition equation, however, we get 
the opposite effect when the probability of a union win is innately low:  a 
union loss associated with lack of opposition, that could lead to the 
incorrect inference that lack of opposition caused the loss.  The net of 
these effects is that single equation estimates are likely to be biased 
toward zero.  In principle one can use L  and C to instrument for opposition, 
but the available measures are too weak, at  least in our data, for 
instrumenting to be  satisfactory. 
Finally,  note that our data are limited  to firma that face organizing 
drives that proceed  to an NI-RB  conducted  election.  We  do not deal with 
management opposition that deters unions from a drive or from carrying it to 
an  election nor  with management recognition  of a union without a 8 
representation election.  The absence of data on  these caaes further 
suggests that our estimates will understate the impact of  opposition on  a 
union win for the broader sample of  all firms that potentially face a drive. 
Survey Data  on  Management Opposition 
As noted at  the outset our empirical  analysis treats an  employers data 
set and a union organizers data set.  The employers data set is based on 
interviews with  firms in  the Boston and Kansas City  National Labor Relations 
Board districts that had elections during the 1980s.  We contacted 243 firms 
that had elections with  over 20 employees in  the potential bargaining unit 
and obtained on-site interviews with management in  202,  for a response rate 
of  83.1 percent:  100 were in the Boston region and 102 were in the Kansas 
City region; 5 percent had elections in 1985; 31 percent in 1984; 12 percent 
in 1983; 10 percent in 1982; 16 percent in 1981;  16 percent in 1980 and 10 
percent in  1979.  The states covered  by the two districts are generally 
reflective of the national labor relations environment,4 and the win rate of 
unions in  our sample was similar to the national average:  unions won 39 
percent of  the elections in  our sample compared to a 38 percent win rate for 
all elections conducted in  1981 with over 20 employees (Medoff,  1984).  In 
addition, the proportion of  firms who lost elections and signed collective 
contracts was close to the national average: 64 percent of the elections won 
by  unions in our sample produced signed  collective contracts; this compares 
with the 63 percent for the period 1979-82 (McDonald,  1983). 
Our second data set is based on an  AFL-CIO Department of Organization & 
Field Services survey of  the organizers involved in 274 NLR8 election 
drives.  The sample covers 15 AFL-CIO  affiliates and consists alnost 
entirely of units with  at least 50 eligible voters.  The sample is geographically dispersed, with  observations  from all regions of the country, 
including the South.  Because some questions  were added midway in  the study, 
however, data on  some aspects of  management opposition are available for 
only half or  so of the sample. 
Both  data  sets suffer from problems  of  missing information for 
occasionally significant numbers of  observations.  To  maximize the usable 
sample sizes in statistical analysis, we assigned the mean value of  a 
variable to missing independent variables, and added a dummy variable that 
took the value one for that observation/variable (Little and Rubin, 1987). 
We report results for samples limited solely by  missing observations on 
independent  variables; however, our analysis of  smaller samples limited to 
observations for which no  independent  variables were  missing yield 
comparable results, suggesting that there is no  selectivity bias with 
respect to observations for which there are missing values. 
Table 1  suamarizes the information from the surveys on  the methods 
firms use to oppose union organizing drives.  Panel A  shows the frequency of 
use of  consultants and of  filed and upheld unfair labor practice charges in 
the employer survey.  Panel B  records similar information for the 
organizers' survey and additional information  on the specific tactics used 
by the companies to deter unionization.  Because the organizers survey 
included lawyers with consultants its  70%  figure is much higher and we 
believe less accurate than the 41% estimated usage of  consultants in  the 
employers survey.5  The proportion of  campaigns in  which unions charged or 
could reasonably be inferred to charge unfair labor practices are of 
comparable magnitude between the surveys,6 though the organizers report many 
more discharges and discriminatory layoffs than indicated in filed charges. 10 
Finally, with  respect to specific tactics, the organizers survey shows that 
the vast  majority of  firms used everything from leaflets to captive audience 
speeches to numerous small worker meetings with  supervisors to oppose 
unionization of their work  force.  Approximately half  of  the organizers were 
asked to evaluate the intensity of  the supervisor's efforts to oppose 
unions, and of  those half  rated the intensity as  high.7 
Table 2  provides some information on  the issues that managers and the 
organizers saw as important in  the organizing drive/campaign.8  The figures 
reveal a striking difference in  their perceptions.  While managers 
recognize that treatment of workers involving fairness or communication or 
dissatisfaction are important causes of  union campaigns, they ace purely 
economic issues-  -wages  end benefits and job security-  -as the key factor; and 
also look outside their firm to  union organizers or preasurea from outside 
unions for the impetus to the drive.  The organizers, by  contrast, viewed 
supervision aa by  far the most important issue in the drive, vith wages and 
fringes next in  importance, and viewed the risk of  strikes, the danger of 
layoffs or  cloaing, and union dues as the 'most important company issues' 
rhat is,  ones that rhe company presented to discourage employees from voting 
for the union with  vsges of  much lesser import.  Finally, going beyond Table 
2, organizers reported that 23% of  the drives were initiated as a result of 
the organizer or the international targeting the firm, which  is of 
comparable magnitude to the percentage of  firms citing union pressure as a 
primary cause.  However, 57% of  campaigns began as a result of  workers in 
the firm calling the union.  Overall the biggest difference between the 
managers and organizers is in the veight plated on  vages and benefits as 
opposed to worker-management relations or "voice" issues. 11 
Determinants of Opposition 
The  results of  our analysis of  the factors that determine management 
opposition in the employers survey are given in  table 3.  Here we measure 
opposition with  two sets of  related variables:  0-1 dummy variahles for 
whether there were unfair labor practice charges associated with  the 
election and whether there were charges that the NLRB upheld; a 0-1 dummy 
for whether or  not the firm hired a consultant and a continuous variable 
measuring the number of  days the firm used the consultant.  We  estimated the 
equations with 0-1 variables with  a logistic form and used  a Tobit analysis 
to estimate the equation for the number of consultant days used  by  the firm. 
The key dependent variable in the analysis is a measure of  the likely loss 
of  profits due to unionization:  the difference between the log of  hourly 
wages and estimated total fringes in unionized firms in  the one-digit 
industry and occupation in  its geographic area and the log of  the firm's own 
hourly wages and fringe benefits.  The greater the compensation difference 
the greater wage increases are likely given unionization and thus the 
greater the loss in  profits.  The estimated impact of the compensation 
difference variable is recorded in the first line of the table.  We also 
examined the impact of an  index of  personnel practices (defined as the sum 
of 0-1 dummy variables for whether or not a firm had each of  the five 
practices listed in the table note) on  managerial opposition.  Because the 
employer's survey lacks good information on  the innate  probability of a 
union victory we  are unable to test for the impact of that variable on 
opposition.  Finally, as can be seen in the  table, we controlled Lot various 
other potential differences between firms,  such as  size of  employment, 
occupation of workers, area, industry,  and experience with unions. 12 
The principle finding in the table ia that firms who fall behind local 
area wages have a higher likelihood of committing unfair labor practices, 
but no greater probability of  using a consultant.  This is consistent with 
the substitution between likely profit loss and management opposition 
predicted by  equation (5)9  The index of  personnel practices, by  contrast, 
has no clear impact on  management opposition, lowering modestly the 
probability of  committing an unfair practice that is upheld by the NLRB, but 
raising modestly employment of consultants.  While we  do not know if  the 
firms with  higher wages in our sample  consciously set wages to reduce the 
attractiveness of  unions to their workers, thete is some evidence from  their 
ensuing behavior consistent with this notion:  firms with large union wage 
differences raised wages more than other firma after the organizing driveJ° 
In  sum,  the employers aurvey  data suggest a substitution  between higher 
wages and the use of  some forms of  management opposition.  The results 
suggest that firms that pay more have a reduced incentive to commit unfair 
practices. 
The evidence on  the determinants of  management opposition in the 
organizers survey, sunusarized  in table 4, both supports and adds to this 
finding.  For this portion of  the analysis, we  esploy three measures of 
management opposition:  charges of unfair labor practices, whether the 
organizer claimed union supporters were fired or  discriminatorily laid off, 
and whether supervisors campaigned against the union.  As  the organizers 
survey lacks information on wagesj we  measure whether an employer is 
practicing "positive industrial relations" and the likely profit loss by 
unionization by  two indices:  an  index of  the fringe benefits provided by 
the firm and an index of work conditions/supervisory practices.  The fringe 13 
index counts the number of fringes  provided by  the firm from the list given 
in  the table note.  The work conditions/superviaory  practices variable sums 
ratings of various conditions/practices using a 1-5 scale, with the highest 
ratings indicating  worse conditions.  Again, we give the specific questions 
used  in the table note.  Finally, the organizers survey contains two 
variables that we  regard as potentially good  measures of the innate 
propensity of  workplaces to  vote for the union:  the percentage of workers 
who signed authorization cards; and an  index of "union  propensity" created 
from questions regarding the attitudes of workers/community toward  unionism 
and employer anti-union activity prior to the election, as listed in the 
table note.  We  uae the card signing variable to test for the  hypothesized 
nonlinearity in  the impact of  the innate  probability of a  union victory by 
forming two dummy variables to reflect the extremes of  the distribution: 
the cases where 40% or  fewer workers signed cards and the cases where more 
than 70% signed cards.  The hypothesized nonlinearity should produce 
negatively signed coefficients on  both  dummy variables, distinguishing the 
extremes from cases with  40-70% cards signed.  We  use the union propensity 
index to test for nonlinearity by  entering linear and squared terms.  Here 
nonlinearity should yield a negative squared term and poaitive linear term. 
There are three findings in  the table.  First,  our measures of positive 
industrial relations/potential profit loss from unionism have the expected 
inverse relation to management committing unfair practices or  firing/laying 
off union activists:  the greater the number of fringe  benefits the less 
likely management is to commit  unfair practices/fire or  discriminatorily 
layoff union activists while by  contrast the poorer work conditions/ 
superviaory practices the more likely they are o  commit such actions. 14 
Second, however, we find that while poor work conditions/supervisory 
practices increase the probability that supervisors  campaign against the 
union, good benefit packages also increase the probability that supervisors 
campaign against the union, perhaps because this gives them a strong 
argument against the union.  Third, we find some evidence for nonlinearity 
in  the relation between our indicators of  the innate probability to unionize 
and unfair practices.  In  columns 1 and 2 the nonlinearity shows up in  our 
union propensity index, which takes a  parabolic form so that a greater union 
propensity has first an  increasing then a decreasing effect on management 
opposition.  The percentage who sign cards,  by  contrast, does not evince 
such  a reversal of  effects:  it shows a fairly continuous impact of card- 
signing on  unfair practices/firings/discriminatory layoffs,  with  greater 
proportions signing cards leading to lesser  management opposition.  This 
supports the notion that management will campaign less virulently when  a 
union has strong aupport but not the  notion that it also campaigns less when 
a union has weak  support.  In the column 3  calculations for the determinants 
of  whether supervisors campaign against the union or not,  however, the 
percentage who sign cards has the predicted nonlinear effect,  with  both  high 
and low percentage cards reducing the probability a company will direct 
supervisors to campaign against the union.  In the underlying data 86% of 
companies have supervisors campaigning against the union when there are 70% 
or  more card-signers, 95% of  companies have them campaigning against the 
union when 40-70% sign,  and 84% have them campaigning when less than 40% 
have them sign.  The union propensity index has no  effect in this 
calculation, however.  While each equation shows some indication of 
nonlinearity, the fact that different indicators show up differently between 15 
them suggests thst this finding be viewed with  csution.  The strong result 
is that firms faced with work forces with the greatest innate probabilIty to 
vote union show  less osposition to  unions than others. 
nentaoftcomes 
While, as noted earlier, there are potential problems in estimating tho 
determinants of NT_RE rspressntscion election in s model in  which ;pposition 
is endogenous, we  have estimsted logistic equations relating the probability 
that a union will  win a representation election to measures of  work 
conditions and opposition.  Even though we  are unlikely to obtain the "true" 
underlying structural relations of  equation I,  it is important to see 
whether our hypothesized indicators of the innate probability of  a union win 
have a positive effect on  winning with methods of opposition held fixed; 
whether any methods of  opposition reduce that probability of a  union win 
despite potential econometric  problems that should bias estimates toward 
zero; and whether or not indicators of  "positive industrial relations" have 
their expected effect on  the chances of  a union victory. 
Table 5 presents the results of  our analysis of the determinants of  a 
union victory in the two surveys.  The coefficients reported in  column 1 
show that out principal measure of  management opposition in the employers 
survey--consultant days used--had a significant negative impact on the 
probability of a union win.  The coefficient on the compensation diffetenco 
variable is positive, and personnel practices ate negative, as one would 
expect, but not significant, while the coefficient on  unfair practices is 
positive with s standard error of approximately the same size.  The 
coefficients tepotted in column 2 for the  organizers survey give a similar 
picture of the determinants of  outcomes, though with  some differences in the 16 
impact of  particular variables.  Here, two factors stand out:  the 
percentage of  workers who sign cards has the greatest positive impact on  a 
union victory while supervisory opposition has the greatest negative impact. 
The index of  total benefits has the expected negative effect on the 
probability of a  union win but its coefficient is not significant, in  part 
because it is inversely related to  the fraction who sign cards.  The index 
of  work  conditions/supervisory  practices also has an  insignificant but 
correctly signed impact, for the same reason.  Finally, in column 3 we  add a 
variable for which we have measures in  only about half of  the cases--an 
index of  the intensity of supervisory opposition (scaled from 1 to 5).  With 
the mean  entered for missing values and a dummy variable to flag those 
caaea, we see that intensity of  supervisor's opposition is a  major 
determinant of  outcomes.  Finally, note that in  the organizers survey unfair 
practices are positively rather than negatively related to the probability 
of a  union victory.  One likely reason for this seemingly aberrant result in 
both  surveys is that unions are unlikely to file charges, even if illegal 
acts were committed, if they win the election drive.  There is,  moreover, 
nothing inconsistent  between these results and time series or industry/state 
calculations that find that the proportion of  workers who are organized 
through  ELItE elections is reduced by  the frequency of  unfair practices, as 
much of  that variation in these studies results from variation in  the number 
of  ELItE elections held  rather than from variation in  win  rates.  It does, 
however, underscore that unfair practices in aggregate studies should be 
viewed solely as an indicator of  management opposition and that its impact 
is largely on  the number of  organizing campaigns)-2 
Effect of  Organizing Drives on  Management Careers 17 
Now  does a union organizing drive affect  management?  As  most union 
studies are concerned with what unions do for their members, there is 
relatively little information on  this question (see,  however, Clark for 
inttiguing evidence on  a small sample of firms).  An  analysis of  management 
opposition to organizing drives cannot, however, neglect the issue.  From 
the perspective or  our model it is important to delineate the direct 
incentives management, as opposed to stockholders,  have  to oppose unionism. 
Knowing how higher management/stockholders treated managers in firms facing 
drives is also important in evaluating their perceptions of  the cause for 
the organizing campaign.  Accordingly, we asked management what had happened 
to the plant aanagets in our employers survey-  -whether they were promoted, 
fired, sent for retraining or  reassigned, or  other.  For the purposes of 
establishing a benchmark we asked the same question of  33 firms who do  not 
experience an organizing drive:  these firms were those named by the firms 
in our sample as their "closest competirot" (see Freeman and Kleiner, 1988) 
and we  asked them for the distribution of  career outcomes for establishment 
managers in  the same period in  which the organizing drive took place. 
Table 6 tabulates the responses to this question, by the organizing 
status of the firm.  Line I shows the  distribution of changes in manager 
status for 202 establishments in our sample in which elections took place. 
Lines 2 thtough 4 give the distributions for varying outcomes of  the 
organizing drive:  a union win and a contract; a union win and no contract; 
and a  union loss in the election.  Line 5  gives the distribution for the 
"control" subsample of  matched (nonunion) establishments that did not face 
an  organizing drive, while line 6 shows the distribution for the pairs of 
these establishments.  The tesults show a clear impact of both an  organizing drive  and a 'mica victory zn tn  crrerr or managers.  Two  percent 01 
manage':  a nu  ;a.  -u.  'r  as Cre.  naared to SI In  tLa raani.r af 
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ale  ;;Lua  and c,cL  p 'tth . ollecti;re ha:g:4ring  rontreac 
At  T elaj''  - f a; ngara Ja  "ua  a ntt-  1  :  unac 
pLO  Aj' -..  -4J  0  a  as  a  .aaple r:ciç  otgaaizan5 dai 
ansi  a.  •.a aaple ahu  ;;  1 up ui.  a uni;n c:ta:  Theaa findings 
(conaa  a  ark' a ?aaar results  -  i,j J'a5i-a far 
undere;aa  anaetaa  a'ç;rse  :  Y,-  dimes.  Fizat,  the, 
suggest 
-  th sanagement has  1  ac  an,,  -  e  engage ar  r- Crave 
indusatial a-elara'vs that deters union  organ  a  activity,  and.  facec with 
a drive, to engage  in  any  activities  that will defeat the union.  Second, 
the aesuir' -an also  be  interpreted as in  sting that a union organizing 
drIve  signals stockholders and  cop management  that the establishment 
management  is, in  fact,  poor. and should he  replaced. 
Conclusions 
The direct role of employers in  union organizing has long been a 
neglected part of  the union organizing literature.  In  this study we  have 
examined the determinants and consequences  of  employer behavior when faced 
with  an  organizing drive.  Our principal substantive findings are: 
o  that there is a substitution  between high  wages/benefits/good work 
conditions/supervisory practices and "tough"  management opposition to 
unionism. 
o that a high innate  propensity for a union victory deters  management 
opposition, while some indicators of a low propensity also teduce 
opposition. 19 
o  that "positive industrial relations' raise the chances the firm 
will defeat the union in  an  election, as does bringing in consultants and 
having supervisors campaign intensely against the union. 
o that the cateers of managers whose wages/supervisory 
practices/benefits lead to union organizing drives, much less to union 
victories, suffer as a result. 
In  general we  interpret our results as consistent with the notion that 
firms behave in  a profit maximizing manner in opposing an organizing drive 
and with the basic proposition that management opposition, reflected in 
diverse forms of behavior, is a key component in the on-going decline in 
private sector unionism in  the  United States. 20 
TABLE 1:  Percentage of  All Firms Using  Specified 
Method of  Opposing Union Organizing Drive 
A.  EMPLOYER SURVEY 
Consultants Used (yes):  41  % 
C  month  13 % 
1 month or more  28 % 
Unfair Labor Practices:  Charses filed  24 % 
Guilty  15 % 
8.  ORGANIZER SURVEY 
Consultants/Lawyers Used (yes):  70 % 
Unfair Labor Practices: 
Filed  36 % 
Discharges or Discriminatory layoffs  42 % 
Tactics: 
Company Leaflets  80  % 
33% 
Sormore  47% 
Company Letters  91 % 
41% 
Sormore  50% 
Captive Audience Speech  91 % 
62% 
Sormore  29% 
Supervisory Small Mtgs. per/employee  92 % 
46% 
5-8  12% 
9 or more  33 % 
Supervisor Intensity in opposing union1 
Low  14% 
Moderate  34 % 
High  51 % 
Source:  Employer Survey:  NSER Survey of 203 Establishments that 
faced organizing drives. 
Organizer Survey:  AFL-CIO Department of  Organization & 
Field Services, Survey of  276 Organizers. 
1Asked of  only half the survey. 21 
TABLE 2: Perceived Cpu.ses of  Oreanizina Drive 
and Issues in Drive 
A.  EMPLOYER SURVEY 
Primary  Primary Plus 
Cause  Secondary Ca" 
Economic 
Wages  &  Benefits  17  %  27  % 
Job Security  10 %  15 % 
'Voice" 
Lack of Fairness  7 %  13 % 
Dissatisfied Employee(s)  14 %  18 % 
Lack of  Communication 
about Company  12 %  19 % 
Union Pressure 
Pressure from other unions 
in establishment or  area  11 %  18 % 
Union Organizer 
7  %  10 % 
B,  ORGANIZERS SURVEY 
Most  Important Issue 
Beneficial for Union Issues 
Supervisory  52 % 
Wages  27 % 
Fringes 
6  % 
Safety  7  % 
Discrimination  3  % 
Pressure  5  % 
Beneficial for Management Issue 
Strikes  36 % 
Layoffs & Closing  16 % 
Dues  13 % 
Wages  2 % 
Other  31 % 
Source:  See Table 1. TABLE 3:  rFFi.i.- 
22 
and Standard  Errors of 
Mnnnement flnnnqitlnnt  Emnlnver  Survey 
Charge of  Guilty of 
Unfair  Unfair  Hired  Consultant 
Consultant  Dave  Used 
Union Compensa-  2.50 







Index of  Person-  -.21 









Employees  /  %/  V  V 
Production/ 
Non-  Production  V  V  7  './ 
KG/Boston  _V  .- 
Mfg/Other  7  ,—  - 
Dummies for 
Missing Indepen- 
dent Vsriables  .,../  u7  '7  V 
Experience 
with  Union  .Z  .—  - 
Summary  Statistics 
Sample Size  188  184  188  184 
Technique  Logistic  Logistic  Logistic  Tobit 
-2 Log Likelihood  184.0  142.3  239.5  682.85 
1Sum of whether firm had any of  5 practices: 
1)  Formal Written Grievance Procedure 
2)  Formal Written Seniority System  for Promotiona, 
3)  Formal Written Sick Leave Policy 
4)  Written Posting of Training Opportunities 
5)  Formal Written Policy for Layoff and Recalls 
Explanatory 23 
TAZLE 4:  Coefficients  and  Standard  Errors for Deteriiinants 
of Manasement Osoosition:  Oranizer's  Suye 










Variables  (13  (2)  (3) 
Index of 
Benefits  -.22(10)  - .19(10)  .41(17) 
Index of Poor Work 
Conditions/Super 
- 
visory Practices  .14(.04)  .12(.04)  .14(.05) 
%  Cards >70%  -.81(45)  -.68(43)  -1.51(65) 
% Cards <40%  .64(.47)  .37(.47)  -.87(73) 
Union Propen- 
sity Index  .37(.24)  .36(.23)  - .28(50) 
Union Propen- 
sity Index2  -.009(005)  008(005)  .01(01) 
Controls 
Industry  /  \_/_  Z 
Region  -  .- 
Age,  Sex, Race  -  — 
"Wage Deficiency"  /  ..-'  ..-' 
Previous Exper- 
ience with  Union  ./  /  \.V 
Summary Statistics 
Sample Size  232  233  244 
-2 Log Likelihood  264.4  280.8  102.2 24 
NOTES TO  TAZLE_4 
Index  of  Benefits sums 0-1 variables for medical insurance, dental 
insurance, sick pay, pension, grievsnce procedure, arbitration, employee 
handbook, open door policy, quality of  work life. 
Index of work conditions/supervisory  orsccices  sums  answers  to:  Is 
supervision unpredictable,  intonsistent or autocratic?  Is  the work of a 
routine  nature where employees receive little recognition from supervisors 
or  little personal job satisfaction? Are employees stuck in  "dead-end" jobs 
with little chance for promotion?  Have there been major accidents in  the 
plant, or are there serious thrests to the  health and safety of  workers? 
Are there severe pressures, including mandatory overtime, placed on 
employees to maintain or increase production?  Is there evidente of 
discrimination or  favoritism of  any  kind?  Do the employees feel that the 
company has little personal concern for them? 
Index of  union propensity:  suma anawera  to:  Haa the  workplace been 
subjected to substantial anti-union propaganda and/or attitude aurveys 
before the organizing campaign started?  Does the company have a pre- 
employment screening process to  weed  out  potential union sympathizers?  Do a 
subatantial number of  employees belong to civil rights groups, tenant 
associationa, social advocacy groups or church organizations which are 
active in community affairs? Is there access to employees, either on or off 
the job?  Are labor unions generally well accepted within  the  community? 
Have there been  any recent shutdowns of large union plants or establishmants 
in  the community?  Have there been  bitter,  highly publicized strikes in the 
community in  the past few years?  Is employee turnover relatively low? 
The variables in the work practices/supervisory  conditions and union 
propensity indices are scaled from 1 to 5, as described in  the text. 25 
TAZLE  5:  Coefficients  and Standard Errors of the Determinants 
of Union Victory in NLRZ Representation Election 
F.mol ovar  Siirvrv  Orann-f mr 
Union Compensation Difference 
Consultant Days Used 
Index of  Personnel Practices 
Unfair Practices 
Index of  Total Benefits 




Intensity of  Supervisors* Campaign 
% Cards 
Index of  Union Propensity 
1.91(1.34) 
- .04(02) 
- . 17(.12) 
.53(.46) 










4.  52 (1. 05) 
.06(.03) 
OTHER CONTROLS  A  B  B 
STJMMARY STATISTICS 
N  190  240  240 
-2 Log Likelihood  225.4  277.4  334,6 
Notes:  A -  See  Table  3  controLs. 
B  -  See  Table  6  controls.  Also  with  dumay  for  whether 
consultant/lawyer  was  used. 
* Available  for 124 carllpaigns  only. 26 
ThZLE 6:  Percentaee of Firas Chanaina Manner 
Status.  by Organizing  Drive 
Manager  Re- 
Manager  assigned to 
No  Manager  Sent for  Another  Manager 
Change  Proiioted  Retraining  Location  Fired  Other  No  Answer 
(1)  All establish- 
ments with  or- 
ganizing drives 
(Percent)  N—202  76  3  1  3  8  8 
(2) Establishments 
where the union 
won and a con- 
tract was 
reached (Per- 
cent)N—50  82  0  2  2  10  4  2 
(3)  Establishments 
where the union 
won the elec- 
tion,  but no 
contract was 
reached (Percent)  61  7  0  4  7  18  4 
N—28 
(4)  Establishments 
where the union 
lost the election 
(Percent)  N—124  77  3  0  3  7  8 
(5)  Sub-sample of 
firms without 
union and no 
election. N—33*  41  21  3  4  2  9 
(6)  Paired Sub- 
sample of firms 
[with those in (5)] 
with organizing 
drives. N—33  70  0  0  3  15  6 
Percentages sum to less than 100 due to rounding. 
*These values are the means of  the percentages of  the change in  manager status over 
the  same time period as firma experiencing;  an; organizing  drive.. 27 
fl4DNOTES 
1.  As  late as 1976 business leaders perceived labor as an overly powerful 
influence group and wanted  strongly to reduce the power of labor.  See 
Sydney Verba and Gary Orren, Equality in America (Harvard 1985). 
2.  Several studies have suggested that a major reason for the  increased 
hostility toward unions over this period was the growth in  the  union- 
nonunion wage gap,  deregulation, and foreign competition with  little change 
in  union workers productivity relative to nonunion workers, resulting in 
reduced firm profits (Freeman and Kleiner, 1986). 
3.  The unfair practices data are from NLR8.  The percenrage who get 
contracts is from Cooke (1985),  McDonald (1983),  and Freeman and Kleiner 
(1986) 
4. A composite ranking of  private sector union density in  the states in our 
sample  was 29th our of  51 (D.C.  included).  The states in  our sample rhar 
had NLRB election data included Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Vermont. 
5. The AFL-CIO questionnaire contained information  that differentiates 
between lawyers and consultants but that information  was nor coded and 
placed on  the computer file that we  used. 
6. The problem is that the AFL-CIO questionnaire  contained a question on 
firings and a separate question on "orher  unfair labor pracrices  that were 
filed with  rhe HLR8.  In  the table we assume that firings were filed 
charges, but the questionnaire is ambiguous on  this. 
7. The questionnaire asked for a rating of intensity from 1 to 5.  Our high 
category is the 5  category, moderate is rhe 3  and 4 category and low is 1 
and 2. 
8. Note that the surveys asked for somewhat different information.  The 
employers survey asked for the causes of the  election drive while the 
organizers survey asked for the most important issue in the campaign. 
9. This finding is not inconsistent with Kleiner's results showing that 
current profitability is unrelated to committing an unfair practice.  In the 
model we invesrigate it is the potential effect of unions on  future profits 
that is the key determinant of unfair practices, not current profitability. 
10.  Ve regressed the difference in the log of  wages one year after the  N1.RB 
election and one year before  the  election on the wage difference and a dummy 
variable for whether or  not the firm signed a collective contract.  The 
coefficient on the compensation difference variable was  .09 with  a standard 
error of (.04)  while the coefficient on  the collective bargaining dummy was 
.01 with a standard error of (.01). 
11.  There was a question about whether the firm has a "wage deficiency' 
which we  entered in the regression; it  had the expected sign in the 
regressions but was of  negligible scatiscical importance. 28 
12. such  a relation is to  be  expected if  management opposition reduces the 
chances of  union victories, leading unions to be  more selective in  the 
campaigns they pursue. 29 
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